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We review some aspects of financial dollarization in Russia, applying the main relevant 
theories to analyze the dynamics of several dollarization indicators. An econometric model 
of the short run dynamics of deposit and loan dollarization is estimated for the last decade. 
We find that ruble appreciation was the main driver of the de-dollarization that occurred 
then and of the later episode of renewed dollarization. We estimate the overall (and sector-
al) currency mismatches of the Russian economy. The results show a gradual improvement 
of the net foreign currency position of the public sector, where we have seen significant 
accumulation of international reserves by the Bank of Russia and repayment of govern-
ment debt. Evidence is also presented for the significant currency risk vulnerability of the 
nonbanking private sector. Several existing empirical studies are examined in order to as-
sess the growth losses of the Russian economy following the crisis of 2008, which was 
linked with the financial dollarization.  
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan rahoitusvarallisuuden dollarisaatiota Venäjällä monien eri in-
dikaattorien avulla. Lainojen ja talletusten dollarisaation vaihteluita viime vuosikymmenen 
aikana selitetään ekonometrisellä mallilla. Tulokset osoittavat, että ruplan kurssivaihtelut 
ovat dollarisaation vaihtelujen merkittävin yksittäinen selittäjä.  Lisäksi tutkimuksessa tar-
kastellaan sektoreittain ulkomaan valuutan määräisten varojen ja velkojen suhdetta (cur-
rency mismatch). Tutkimuksessa havaitaan, että julkisen sektorin tila on parantunut merkit-
tävästi keskuspankin valuuttavarannon kasvun ja ulkomaisen julkisen velan supistumisen 
ansiosta. Yrityssektorilla taas ulkomaisten velkojen kasvu on johtanut valuuttakurssiriskin 
kasvuun. Lopuksi tutkimuksessa arvioidaan dollarisaation osuutta vuoden 2008 talouskri-
isissä. 
 
Asiasanat: dollarisaatio, Venäjä, tasevaikutukset, currency mismatch 
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Introduction 
 
Currency substitution has always been an important feature of the Russian economy. The 
hyperinflation that occurred in the early 1990s and the major depreciation events (most 
importantly, the currency crisis of 1998) increased the demand for reserve currency for 
holding savings. In subsequent years, however, ruble appreciation has led to extensive de-
dollarization, only to  be followed by  a  shift  into  foreign currency  assets  in  late 2008. 
Alongside these developments, we have seen certain other aspects of financial dollariza-
tion. In a situation of rapid economic growth, an under-developed banking system, and 
tightly managed exchange rates; excessive reliance on foreign money markets has resulted 
in the creation of an abundance of foreign currency-linked liabilities.  
Analysis of dollarization processes is an important element of the central bank‟s 
research agenda because overall economic performance as well as the implementation of 
monetary policy may be substantially  impacted by changes in  agents‟ currency prefer-
ences. Dollarization of the economy has a strong influence on the stability of a banking 
system that faces liquidity and solvency risks as external debt is being accumulated by dif-
ferent sectors of the economy while there is a demand for the domestic currency. The 
analysis of dollarization is also crucial for the conduct of monetary policy since dollariza-
tion hinders the central bank‟s efforts to act as lender of last resort and complicates its li-
quidity management and thus impedes the achievement of the ultimate goals of monetary 
policy, particularly during sudden stop episodes. Dollarized economies are highly exposed 
to the risks of currency and financial crises that threaten financial stability and disturb the 
macroeconomic balance. Consequently, the problem of financial dollarization is closely 
related to the issues of exchange rate policy and financial stability.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the drivers of these processes and review the 
possible consequences. The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a general de-
scription of the dynamics of certain dollarization indicators for Russia. In Section 2 some 
econometric models of the short run dynamics of deposit and loan dollarization are pre-
sented. In Section 3 we conduct a balance-sheet analysis and estimate currency mismatches 
for different sectors of the Russian economy. In Section 4 we examine how dollarization 
might have affected Russian economic performance in view of the recent financial crisis, 
and Section 5 concludes. 
 Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
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1  The evolution of financial dollarization in Russia 
 
Dollarization
1 is peculiar to many emerging markets and to a number of transition econo-
mies where foreign currency substitutes for the domestic currency as a store of value, unit 
of account and means of payment. In the 1990s, a many restrictions on transactions on for-
eign exchange market were lifted in Russia. At the same time, the country had been going 
through a prolonged period of macroeconomic instability against a backdrop of sharp de-
valuations of the domestic currency and galloping inflation, which dampened activity in all 
sectors of the economy. In conditions of a dramatic drop in ruble purchasing power, the 
role of foreign currency (mainly the USD) had grown considerably and had since remained 
strong. The last decade was marked by unstable dynamics of the dollarization of the Rus-
sian economy, including periods of both accelerated growth and easing demand for foreign 
currency. We will review the different aspects of financial dollarization in more detail in 
this section.  
Deposit dollarization. We use the ratios of foreign currency deposits to total de-
posits in the banking system and to broad money as indicators of the degree of dollariza-
tion
2. It should be noted that after the introduction of euro, economic agents began to hold 
their foreign currency assets (cash and non-cash) in two currencies. At the same time, de-
spite the prevalence of the US dollar, the share of euro denominated assets was gradually 
rising. Thereby the overall level of deposit dollarization (as well as the dynamics of foreign 
currency in circulation) was affected not only by the ruble-to-dollar exchange rate but also 
by ruble-to-euro rate.  
As seen in Figure 1, the level of deposit dollarization in Russia was unstable (the 
share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits ranged from 43 to 12.8%). Note that 
there were two dramatic spikes in the level of deposit dollarization, both associated with 
crisis episodes, in 1998 and 2008-2009. 
                                                 
1 Traditionally the term “dollarization” implies replacement of domestic currency by US dollars as the me-
dium of exchange, store of value and unit of account. After formation of European Monetary System and 
introduction of the single currency (euro), the new term “euroization” (completely analogous to dollarization) 
came into use. Euroization was quite typical for a number of transition economies, including Russia. We use 
the term “dollarization” to denote the replacement of the national currency by any foreign currency. 
2 Source: Banking System Survey, Monetary and Financial Statistics, Bank of Russia. 
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The period from 1999 to 2007 was characterized by a gradual decline in the level of de-
posit dollarization (especially, starting in 2003, when the ruble began to appreciate persis-
tently). In spite of the volatile dynamics of ruble money supply and foreign currency de-
posits, the level of deposit dollarization had been falling persistently, from its maximum 
value of 40-43% at the end of 1998 to a minimum 12-13% at the start of 2008. It should be 
noted that, starting in mid-2007 the growth rate of foreign currency deposits began to rise 
and the trend towards de-dollarization stopped with the weakening of the ruble against the 
euro (while the ruble continued to strengthen against the US dollar).  
Available statistical data enable one to analyze the dynamics of foreign currency 
deposits and the level of deposit dollarization for households, non-financial organizations 
and financial organizations separately
3. The level of deposit dollarization of non-financial 
organizations generally was higher (Figure 2) than for households (except in 2002-2003). 
As opposed to these two sectors, the level of deposit dollarization for financial organiza-
tions was considerably lower (except from mid-2002 to mid-2003) but much more volatile. 
                                                 
3 Financial institutions are useful for money accumulation and redistribution. Financial institutions include 
investment funds, trust, leasing and factoring companies, commodity and stock exchanges, brokerage firms 
operating in the stock market, insurance companies, nongovernmental pension funds, the state‟s Deposit In-
surance Agency and the open join-stock company RUSNANO, established via reorganization of the state 
corporation Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies. Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
and Elena Vasilieva 
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Over the last three years, the shares of households‟ and non-financial organizations‟ for-
eign currency deposits were approximately the same (45-50% on average) while the share 
of financial organizations was insignificant (1-2.5% on average). 
 















































































































































































































Other financial institutions Total
 
 
Latest world financial crisis, which had manifested itself in Russia most apparently in the 
second half of 2008, reversed the trend towards deposit de-dollarization. Against the back-
ground of a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency and a substantial increase in the 
level of overall macroeconomic uncertainty the total volume of foreign currency deposits 
in dollar terms more than doubled during the years 2008-2009. By the beginning of 2009, 
the level of deposit dollarization, measured as a share of foreign currency deposits in total 
deposits, was close to 33-35%. The highest level of dollarization was observed in the sec-
tor of non-financial organizations (almost 40% in early 2009). 
The stabilization of the situation on foreign exchange market with the subsequent 
appreciation  of  national  currency  combined  with  gradual  macroeconomic  stabilization 
brought the level of deposit dollarization down. Households and financial organizations 
experienced the greatest reduction in deposit dollarization. Unlike the pre-crisis period, the 
level of deposit dollarization in the sector of non-financial organizations in 2009-2011 no-
ticeably exceeded that of households. On the whole, by the middle of 2011 the level of de-
posit dollarization has not yet reached the pre-crisis level. 
Foreign currency in circulation. The level of dollarization of the economy can 
also  be  characterized  by  the  total  volume  of  foreign  cash  that  circulates  domestically. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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However, in this case one faces the problem of statistical measurement or indicator of dol-
larization. Our estimates of the volume of foreign cash circulating outside the banking sys-
tem are based on Bank of Russia (CBR) statistics, namely the International Investment Po-
sition of the Russian Federation, Balance of Payments of the Russian Federation. Accord-
ing to this data the volume of foreign cash in circulation in Russia has been steadily de-
creasing since  2003 (Figure 3). 
 
















































































































Ruble devaluation at the end of 2008 triggered unprecedented growth in households‟ de-
mand for foreign cash. As a result, the total volume of foreign cash outside the banking 
system increased from approximately 21 billion US dollars at mid-2008 to more than 50 
billion US dollars at the start of 2009. Starting in February 2009, as the foreign exchange 
market began to stabilize, the level of foreign cash in circulation began to fall so that by 
mid-2011 it had reached about 24 billion US dollars. 
Loan dollarization. Prior to the most recent crisis, the level of loan dollarization 
was falling, albeit not as rapidly as was the level of deposit dollarization. Over the period 
from 2001 to mid-2008, the level of the former dropped from 32% to 18%, while the level 
of the latter dropped from 40% to 13-14%. A dramatic rise in loan dollarization occurred 
during the recent financial crisis, accompanied with a sharp depreciation of the domestic Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
and Elena Vasilieva 
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currency. In the second half of 2009, the level of loan dollarization began to decline persis-
tently and by mid-2011 it had reached 15%, which is notably below the pre-crisis level.  
 

















































































































































































































Households Non-financial organisations Other financial institutions Total
 
 
Loan dollarization (in contrast to deposit dollarization) varied considerably across the sec-
tors of the Russian economy. The share of foreign currency loans in the total volume of 
loans  obtained  by  households  was  lowest  for  non-financial  and  financial  organizations 
(Figure 4). The dynamics of dollarization of financial organizations‟ loans was the most 
volatile. It is noteworthy that, in the post-crisis period, dollarization of loans to financial 
organizations rose while it decreased in two other sectors. A steady decline in dollarization 
of financial organizations‟ loans did not begin until 2010. 
Loans to non-financial organizations accounted for the largest portion of foreign 
currency  loans  (80-95%).  The  share  of  foreign  currency  loans  granted  to  households 
ranged from 3 to 18% (it rose dramatically in 2006-2007). Foreign currency loans to finan-
cial organizations represented only a small fraction in the total volume of foreign currency 
loans (1-4%).   
Among the drivers of domestic financial dollarization the yield and borrowing 
cost differentials are usually regarded as the key factors (see e.g. Ize and Levy-Yeyati 
                                                 
4 Source: Banking System Survey, Monetary and Financial Statistics, Bank of Russia. 
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(2005) and Levy-Yeyati (2006) for a review of the relevant theories). One obvious deter-
minant of this indicator is the interest rate differential between deposits (loans) denomi-
nated in domestic versus foreign currency. Another is exchange rate appreciation expecta-
tions. We can estimate the interest rate differential as the difference between the ruble in-
terest rate and the weighted average of euro and USD interest rates on deposits and loans. 
We can also proxy the exchange rate expectations by the realized annual ruble weighted 
appreciation rate against USD and euro. By summing these two we obtain a proxy for the 
implied deposit yield (borrowing cost) differential. Figure 5 demonstrates that the latter 
component mainly determined the variation of these indicators, suggesting that exchange 
rate fluctuations were more important for dollarization dynamics than interest rate differen-
tials. 
 
Figure 5   Implied deposit yield vs borrowing cost differentials (p.p.a) and  






































































































































Ruble appreciation rate Deposits yield differential Borrowing cost differential
 
 
Motives for providing loans in foreign currency also depend on the level of development of 
the  domestic  financial  markets.  Rapid  growth  of  lending  by  Russian  banks  and  non-
financial organizations in foreign financial markets (especially in 2005-2008) was due to 
better terms of borrowing abroad compared to borrowing on the domestic money market 
under the managed exchange rate regime. In addition, due to the underdeveloped state of 
the domestic money market, Russian banks were not able to satisfy an increasing demand Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
and Elena Vasilieva 
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for loans from non-financial organizations. Therefore an increase in the degree of openness 
of the Russian economy together with enhanced dependence on international capital mar-
kets has led to the accumulation of foreign currency liabilities (Figure 6). In combination 
with notable dollarization of domestic liabilities, banks‟ currency matching behavior could 
be another driver of financial dollarization dynamics. 
 

















































































































































































































Foreign assets Foreign liabilities Net foreign assets
 
 
The dollarization of foreign debt is another important aspect of financial dollarization. 
The reasons for the country being unable to borrow abroad in its own currency include the 
low level of institutional development, low credibility of monetary policy and questionable 
fiscal solvency (see Hausmann and Panizza (2003) for a review).  All these factors could 
be relevant for Russia (particularly after the crisis of 1998) making it nearly impossible for 
the Russian private sector to borrow in rubles on the international markets in the early 
2000s. The foreign debt was gradually being de-dollarized prior to the crisis of 2008 (Fig-
ure 7), immediately after which another rise in dollarization occurred. Interestingly, in the 
years following the crisis, the banking sector has managed to reduce its dollarized foreign 
debt faster than the real sector. 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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2  Econometric analysis of financial dollarization 
 
We conduct formal econometric analysis of domestic
5 deposit and loan dollarization to 
measure the impacts of different explanatory factors and analyze the short-term dynamics 
of dollarization. Our estimation strategy and choice of variables are closely related to a 
study by Neanidis and Savva (2009) that provides a comprehensive review of the modeling 
of financial dollarization in emerging markets. The benchmark specifications of our regres-
sions are 
 
∆ DDt =α1*(1-dum2008)*erft + α2*dum2008*erft + α3*dum2005*er_combt + α4*mbft+ 
α5*∆ ratiot+ + α6*∆ LDt+ α7*irdt+ α8*∆ DDt-1+α9*∆ DDt-2+ α10+εt         (1) 
 
∆ LDt = β1*(1-dum2008)*erft + β2*dum2008*erft + β3*dum2005*er_combt + β4*mbft+ 
β5*∆ ratiot+ + β6*∆DDt+ β7*irdt+ β8*∆ LDt-1+ β9*∆ LDt-2+ β10+ut     (2) 
 
We use changes in deposit dollarization (∆ DD) and in loan dollarization (∆ LD) as  de-
pendent variables.  
                                                 
5 The formal econometric analysis of foreign debt dollarization is hampered by the shortness of time series 
available only at quarterly frequency. Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
and Elena Vasilieva 
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The erf variable is the exchange rate factor
6. Because data are not publicly avail-
able on the structure of foreign currency deposits and loans in Russia we used the weighted 
average of ruble monthly depreciation rates against the USD and euro, with weights equal 
to those of the bi-currency basket that was introduced as an operational target by Bank of 
Russia in 2005 (before 2005 the USD appreciation rate was used to construct the erf vari-
able). Judging by other subsidiary indicators, the weights of the bi-currency basket seem to 
be an appropriate measure of currency preferences in Russia. During the estimation period 
the weight attached to the euro in the basket has changed from 0.1 to 0.45. We estimate the 
coefficient  of  erf  separately  before  and  after  the  crisis  of  2008  (for  this,  we  use  the 
dum2008 dummy variable that equals 0 before September 2008 and 1 thereafter). In this 
we are able to examine whether the increased flexibility of the exchange rate had any ef-
fect on dollarization. (Barajas and Morales (2003), for example, argue that a pegged ex-
change rate regime encourages financial dollarization). We have also added the er comb 
variable, which is equal to the higher appreciation rate versus the ruble for the two curren-
cies (USD and euro) at time t. The inclusion of this variable enables us to capture the ef-
fects of possible switching between foreign currencies if at least one of them is appreciat-
ing against the ruble, instead of decreasing the overall share of foreign currency deposits. 
Assuming the adaptive nature of expectations regarding the exchange rate dynamics, we 
use the appreciation rate in the form of a backward-looking 6 month moving average in 
constructing the er_comb variable. Clearly this switching effect is only relevant if the two 
foreign currencies are regarded as alternatives. That was hardly the case while the euro 
continued to gain ground as a reserve currency in Russia. We therefore introduced the 
dummy variable dum2005 (equal to 0 before January 2005 and 1 thereafter
7) and estimated 
the coefficient for the er_comb variable separately for the period beginning in 2005 (the 
coefficient for the former part of the sample was estimated but was insignificant and hence 
removed from the final specification). 
Another category of explanatory variables is supposed to capture banks‟ currency 
matching behavior. As in Basso et al. (2011) we use the increase in the ratio of banks‟ for-
eign liabilities to total liabilities, net of deposits (∆ ratio), as an indicator of changes in 
                                                 
6 The changes in exchange rate were transformed so as to be proportional to the mechanical re-evaluation 
effect at time t (see Honohan (2007) for details). That is, for deposit dollarization erft = (1-DDt-1)*DDt-1*(et/et-
1-1), where e is the ruble/foreign currency exchange rate. The erf  variable in the loan dollarization equation 
was similarly constructed.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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banks‟ balance sheet structure. We also include changes in loan dollarization and deposit 
dollarization as explanatory variables in loan and deposit dollarization equations accord-
ingly.  
Other variables in the model are the monetary base factor
8 (mbf), the differential 
between ruble interest rate and the weighted average of euro and USD interest rates on de-
posits and loans (ird), two lagged dependent variables that prevented autocorrelation of 
residuals, and a constant (the variables are shown on Figure 8 and summary statistics are 
reported in Table 1). 
 
Table 1  Variables used in equations (1) and (2) 
Variable  Mean  Std Deviation  Min  Max 
∆ Deposit dollarization  -0.0014  0.0156  -0.0392  0.0887 
∆ Loan dollarization  -0.0013  0.0057  -0.0171  0.0198 
erf (deposit dollarization)  0.0002  0.0039  -0.0093  0.0301 
erf (loan dollarization)  0.0002  0.0039  -0.0082  0.0296 
er_comb  0.0074  0.012  -0.0088  0.0687 
mbf (deposit dollarization)  -0.0041  0.0123  -0.0514  0.0435 
mbf (loan dollarization)  -0.0042  0.013  -0.0535  0.0417 
∆ ratio  0.0011  0.0252  -0.0586  0.082 
Deposits interest rate differential  3.36  2.45  0.488  12.3 
Loans interest rate differential  3.99  2.11  0.3  10.34 
 
We used monthly data over the period January 2001 to June 2011. The use of earlier ob-
servations is impeded by data availability. The dynamics of the financial variables in the 
period following the 1998 crisis are also excessively volatile and their inclusion would 
render some of the time series non-stationary (in our sample, stationarity is confirmed by 
the KPSS unit-root test reported in Table 2). We consider the sample to be quite represen-
tative, as it includes the periods of both gradual de-dollarization and the partial return of 
dollarization in 2008. 
                                                                                                                                                    
7 This period was chosen arbitrarily and coincides with the inclusion of the euro in the exchange rate target of 
the CBR. The results remain robust for the alternative periods starting in 2004 and 2006. 
8 Similarly to the exchange rate factor variable changes in monetary base were transformed so as to be pro-
portional to the mechanical effect coming from presumed changes the nominal value of national currency 
deposits. That is, for deposit dollarization mbft = (1-DDt-1)*DDt-1*(mt/mt-1-1), where m is the broad monetary 
base. The mbf  variable in the loan dollarization equation was similarly constructed. Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
and Elena Vasilieva 
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We report estimates of the benchmark model, including all explanatory variables as well as 
the specification that includes only statistically significant (t-statistic>1.5) estimates.  In 
order to check for robustness of estimates and to take account of the possibility of explana-
tory factors being endogenous relative to dollarization, we calculated both OLS and GMM
9 
estimates. In the latter case we used 3 lags of the dependent and explanatory variables, 
changes in oil price and USD/ruble exchange rate appreciation as instrumental variables.  
 
Table 2  KPSS unit root tests results 
 
Variable  LM-statistic 
∆ Deposit dollarization  0.08 
∆ Loan dollarization  0.07 
erf (deposit dollarization)  0.07 
erf (loan dollarization)  0.07 
er_comb  0.08 
mbf (deposit dollarization)  0.18 
mbf (loan dollarization)  0.16 
∆ ratio  0.17 
Deposits interest rate differential  0.29 
Loans interest rate differential  0.56 
 
Null: the variable is stationary 
Critical value of test statistic: at 10%-level-0.35, at 5%-level-0.46, at 1%-level-0.74 
 
                                                 
9 We used the Quadratic Spectral kernel that was shown to be optimal in Andrews (1991). The bandwidth 
selection is also based on Andrews (1991). This approach yields results that are relatively robust to the re-
gression set-up. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 3  Deposit dollarization equation (1) 
Variable 





















dum2005 * highest of USD/euro ap-





















∆ loan dollarization  0.14 
(0.78)  -  - 
deposits interest rate differential  -0.00 
(-0.06)  -  - 


















Model (2) residuals tests (p-value):    LM (1 lag)=0.07                     LM (12 lags)=0.51 
Model (2) R
2=0.73                             ARCH-LM (1 lag)=0.47        ARCH-LM (12 lags)=0.95 
 
Deposit dollarization increases (more than the mechanical effect would imply since the co-
efficient is larger than unity) in response to ruble depreciation against the bi-currency bas-
ket. As discussed in Honohan (2007) the amplifying (higher than unity) coefficient also 
means that exchange rate fluctuations could have the destabilizing effect. The estimated 
magnitude of exchange rate effect is substantially higher than the estimates obtained by 
Neanidis and Savva (2009) or Honohan (2007) for a cross section of emerging markets
10. 
This relationship seems not to have changed notably since the crisis of 2008. The presence 
of at least one foreign currency with a positive appreciation rate on the preceding period 
contributes to the dollarization growth. These results are quite robust in respect to the esti-
mation method. 
The monetary base expansion restrains deposit dollarization, although the pass-
through is less than one-to-one.  
                                                 
10 The comparison between these models should be conducted cautiously, since the set-up is not fully identi-
cal. For example contrarily to Neanidis and Savva (2009) and Honohan (2007) our model does not include 
the error correction term in the form of lagged deviation of actual dollarization measure from the trend.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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There is a negative relationship between deposit dollarization and banks‟ foreign 
liabilities growth, which can be seen as evidence of currency matching by banks. The 
change in loan dollarization also has the “correct” sign but is statistically insignificant, as 
is the interest rate differential.   
 
Table 4   Loan dollarization equation (2) 
Variable 





















dum2005 * highest of USD/euro ap-
preciation rate against ruble 
-0.01 
(-0.3)  -  - 
monetary base factor  -0.01 
(-0.25)  -  - 
∆ foreign liabilities to total liabilities 
ratio 
0.01 
(0.69)  -  - 






loans interest rate differential  0.02 
(1.07)  -  - 


















Model (2) residuals tests (p-value):    LM (1 lag)=0.39                     LM (12 lags)=0.88 
Model (2) R
2=0.41                             ARCH-LM (1 lag)=0.2          ARCH-LM (12 lags)=0.49 
 
Estimates of the loan dollarization equation provide evidence that the time-varying ex-
change rate effect is larger than the pure mechanical re-evaluation effect on the pre-crisis 
sample (meaning that it was borrowers rather than the banks that were willing to accept the 
exchange rate risk) and significantly lower after the crisis. That is consistent with our sup-
position regarding changes in borrowers‟ behavior following the increase in exchange rate 
volatility. Whereas during the earlier part of the sample borrowers seemed to perceive ex-
change rate risks as negligible, this changed in the latter half of 2008 when expectations of 
ruble depreciation became widespread. Receding demand for foreign currency loans during 
a currency crisis is well-documented (see for example Hale and Arteta (2009)), and we be-
lieve this was also the case for Russia. Even after the exchange rate dynamics stabilized, Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
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borrowers continued to rebalance their portfolios without overt considerations about ongo-
ing  exchange  rate  changes.  The  alternative  exchange  rate  variable  -  the  highest  of 
USD/ruble and euro/ruble - appreciation rates - does not seem to be relevant for loan dol-
larization.  
The coefficient of the monetary base effect is small and not significant statisti-
cally. This may indicate that, while there is a fairly strong link between ruble deposit and 
monetary base growth, the relationship between monetary expansion and ruble loan supply 
may be less straightforward.  
Finally we find a some evidence of currency matching behavior – this time the 
statistically significant variable is deposit dollarization rather than the foreign liabilities 
ratio.  
Like the deposit dollarization equation, the interest rate differential here is not sta-
tistically significant. 
Overall, we conclude that our estimates of deposit and loan dollarization drivers 
in Russia are similar to those usually obtained for emerging markets (as in e.g. Neanidis 
and Savva (2009) or Basso et al. (2011)). One peculiarity is the dominant magnitude of the 
exchange rate effect (excluding the most recent developments in loan dollarization) and the 
low significance of the interest rate differential. This latter result may be explained by 
households‟ (quite fair) perception that the difference in yields (in ruble terms) between 
foreign currency and ruble deposits was also mainly determined by exchange rate fluctua-




3  Balance-sheet analysis and currency mismatches 
 
To assess the implications of financial dollarization for financial fragility we employ bal-
ance-sheet analysis. The methodology of balance-sheet analysis was devised by Allen and 
others (2002). The aim is to measure vulnerabilities due to mismatches in the structure of 
assets and liabilities at the sectoral level and assess the resulting macroeconomic risks. 
Balance-sheet analysis can be considered an important complement to  more traditional 
methods of assessing financial stability based on analysis of flow variables, such as fiscal 
and current account balances. It is also widely used for financial crisis prediction. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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We apply balance-sheet analysis in order to estimate currency mismatches among 
sectors of Russian economy over a period 2000 to 2010. Our goal is to determine what sec-
tors were highly exposed to exchange rate risks during the global financial crisis of 2008. 
We consider four sectors: government, Central Bank, banking sector and private 
nonbanking sector. The latter consists of households, non-financial commercial organiza-
tions and nonbanking financial organizations. We cannot examine them separately due to a 
lack of data. The main data source is the statistics of the Bank of Russia, notably the Credit 
Institutions Survey, Banking System Survey, Review of the Banking Sector of the Russian 
Federation and External Sector Statistics. Some data gaps remain but these are believed to 
be negligible. 
For each sector we select the foreign currency accounts that can be regarded as 
claims or liabilities of the particular sector to other sectors, including the external sector 
(see Tables 5-8). As a basis for construction of these accounts we use the foreign currency 
balance sheet of a partially dollarized economy, as presented in Reinhart and others (2003). 
In order to take into account the specificity of Russian economy we exclude some accounts 
that we consider negligible or irrelevant and add some accounts that are found only in Rus-
sian practice. 
 
Table 5  Government 
Government 
Assets  Liabilities 
Foreign-currency assets held abroad  Foreign-currency net bank credit 
     
External foreign-currency debt 
Source: External Debt, External Sector Statistics, Bank of Rus-
sia. 
     
Foreign-currency-linked domestic debt 
Source: Review of the Banking Sector of the Russian Federation, 
Bank of Russia. 
 
Table 6  Central Bank 
Central Bank 
Assets  Liabilities 
Net foreign assets 
Source: Central Bank Survey, Bank 
of Russia.  Reserve requirements on foreign-currency bank deposits 
     
Foreign-currency deposits of banking sector 
Source: Central Bank Survey, Bank of Russia. 
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Table 7  Banking sector 
Banking sector 
Assets  Liabilities 
Foreign-currency bank loans 
Source: Banking System Survey, Bank of Russia. 
Foreign-currency bank deposits 
Source: Banking System Survey, Bank of Russia. 
Foreign-currency assets held abroad 
Source: Credit Institutions Survey, Bank of Russia. 
External foreign-currency liabilities 
Source: Credit Institutions Survey, Bank of Rus-
sia. 
Foreign-currency-linked government debt 
Source: Review of the Banking Sector of the Russian 
Federation, Bank of Russia.       
Foreign-currency net credit to the government       
Foreign-currency deposits held at Central Bank 
Source: Central Bank Survey, Bank of Russia.       
 
Table 8  Private nonbanking sector 
Private nonbanking sector 
Assets  Liabilities 
Foreign-currency cash holdings 
Source: International Investment Position of Rus-
sian Federation, Bank of Russia. 
Foreign-currency bank loans 
Source: Banking System Survey, Bank of Russia. 
Foreign-currency assets held abroad 
Source: International Investment Position of Rus-
sian Federation, Bank of Russia. 
External foreign-currency liabilities 
Source: International Investment Position of Rus-
sian Federation, Bank of Russia. 
Foreign-currency bank deposits 
Source: Banking System Survey, Bank of Russia.  Domestic foreign-currency bonds 
Foreign-currency-linked government debt       
 
We exclude foreign currency-linked government debt to the private nonbanking sector be-
cause we assume that this sector does not hold foreign currency denominated sovereign 
bonds or if it does the position is negligible. We also assume that all of the private non-
banking sector‟s foreign currency bonds are owned by non-residents. Therefore, they are 
already included in external foreign currency liabilities of this sector. In Russia the banking 
sector does not generally issue credit to government. Thus we exclude foreign currency net 
bank credit to government from the balance sheets of the government and banking sector. 
By assuming that all foreign assets of government are held in the Bank of Russia as inter-
national reserves we are able to exclude this account from the government balance sheet. 
Finally, we exclude required reserves on foreign currency bank deposits from the balance 
sheet of the Bank of Russia because all reserves, irrespective of the currency in which de-
posits are denominated, are held at the Bank of Russia in rubles. 
In December 2008 commercial banks were allowed to place foreign currency on 
deposit at the Bank of Russia. Therefore we include foreign currency deposits held at Cen-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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tral Bank in balance sheets of banking sector and the Bank of Russia as assets and liabili-
ties respectively. 
After we have built the foreign currency balance sheets we estimate net foreign 
currency positions defined as foreign currency assets minus foreign currency liabilities. All 
foreign currency assets and liabilities are denominated in rubles, while net foreign currency 
position is calculated in percentage of GDP. Net foreign currency position can be consid-
ered as an indicator of a sector‟s vulnerability to movements in the exchange rate. In par-
ticular, if the net foreign currency position is negative, this means that this sector is vulner-
able to exchange rate depreciation. Using net foreign currency positions for each sector we 
estimate net foreign currency position for private and public sectors and finally for the 
Russian economy as a whole. 
 











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liabilities of Central Bank
Liabilities of government
Liabilities of banking sector
Liabilties of private non-banking
sector
Assets of government
Assets of Central Bank
Assets of banking sector
Assets of private non-banking
sector
Net Foreign Currency Position
 
 
Our findings indicate that starting in year 2000 the net foreign currency position of the 
Russian economy (Figure 9) has been improving steadily. It has risen by about 40 percent 
of GDP since 2000 to about a positive 21 percent of GDP. We conclude that on the aggre-
gate level the Russian economy was vulnerable to exchange rate depreciation up to 2004, 
when the net foreign currency position turned positive. Further increase in the net foreign 
currency position created a significant risk of ruble appreciation. However, the dynamics 
of  net  foreign  currency  positions  in  the  different  sectors  of  Russian  economy  display 
highly dissimilar trends. Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
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The government‟s net foreign currency position (Figure 10) has improved dra-
matically since 2000. The sharp fall in net foreign currency exposure from 47 percent of 
GDP in 2000 to just under 2 percent in 2010 reflects a reduction in external foreign cur-
rency debt, mainly due to early repayments of debt to the Paris Club and International 
Monetary Fund, financed from the Stabilization Fund. The ruble appreciation that occurred 
between 2003 and 2007 has also contributed to the reduction. Thus, the net foreign cur-
rency position of this sector is not a cause of concern. 
 


















The CBR‟s net foreign currency position (Figure 11) has almost quadrupled during the pe-
riod studied. The persistent growth of net foreign assets up to year 2007 was driven by 
several factors. An increase in the Bank of Russia‟s international reserves reflects large 
purchases of foreign currency in response to strong capital inflows and upward pressure on 
the ruble. Conversion of foreign currency holdings into rubles by individuals and compa-
nies, reflecting a decline in deposit dollarization, also contributed to the build-up of re-
serves. Enduring budget surpluses, stemming largely from substantial tax revenues from 
oil  exports,  led to  a large  accumulation of the Stabilization Fund,  which was  invested 
mainly in foreign currency denominated assets. Since the Stabilization Fund appears on the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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CBR balance sheet, we consider it a part of the CBR‟s foreign currency assets, despite the 
fact that it is government owned. A slight decline in the net foreign currency position over 
the next three years can be regarded as a result of two opposing effects. CBR actions to 
stabilize the foreign exchange market in the face of huge capital outflows have had a nega-
tive effect on its net foreign assets, while a sharp devaluation of the ruble has had a posi-
tive effect. Thus the whole sector is subject to significant exchange rate risk in connection 
with ruble appreciation. 
 




















The net foreign currency position of the banking sector (Figure 12) had been deteriorating 
up to the end of 2007, mainly due to a substantial increase in external foreign currency li-
abilities. In fact, since a significant part of foreign assets of the banking sector were in the 
form of claims on the domestic nonbanking private sector, which were likely to become 
illiquid in the event of a sharp ruble depreciation, the banking sector seemed quite vulner-
able to exchange rate risk. In 2008 there was considerable growth in foreign currency as-
sets relative to foreign currency liabilities, so that the net foreign currency position turned 
out to be positive. This hike in foreign currency assets was mainly due to reallocation of 
CBR foreign currency reserves via direct purchases of foreign currency by commercial 
banks. Moreover, commercial banks were allowed to open foreign currency deposits at the 
CBR, which had become another foreign currency asset of the banking sector. The net for-Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
and Elena Vasilieva 
 
Financial dollarization in Russia:  
causes and consequences 
 
 
  28 
eign currency position of the banking sector at the end of 2010 was about 2 percent of 
GDP, which leads us to consider exchange rate risk of this sector to be minor. 
 













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Foreign currency bank deposits
External foreign currency
liabilities




Foreign currency bank loans
Foreign currency assets held
abroad
Net Foreign Currency Position
 
 
During the period 2000 to 2007 the net foreign currency position of the private nonbanking 
sector (Figure 13) gradually deteriorated, so that by the end of 2007 it had reached minus 
17 percent of GDP. This decrease reflects a gradual decline in the foreign currency assets 
of this sector, including foreign currency deposits, along with an accumulation of external 
foreign currency liabilities, and can be considered a direct consequence of the ruble appre-
ciation that began at the end of 2002. An increase in foreign currency deposits and external 
foreign currency assets led to some improvement in the net foreign currency position at the 
end of 2008. The next two years saw a marginal deterioration. As a result, net foreign cur-
rency liabilities amounted to slightly more than 10 percent of GDP thus making this sector 
quite vulnerable to ruble depreciation. 
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From the negative foreign currency position of the nonbanking private sector we conclude 
that this sector has suffered the most from ruble devaluation at the end of 2008. Exchange 
rate risk vulnerability of the banking sector can be considered moderate. Due to its sub-
stantial positive net foreign currency position, we conclude that the public sector is well 
protected against the consequences of ruble depreciation. At the same time this makes it 
quite vulnerable to ruble appreciation. 
The metric of currency mismatches that we have use thus far does not take into 
account whether borrowers in foreign currency are hedged against exchange rate risk. Ran-
ciere et al. (2010) introduce a new adjusted measure of currency mismatches that controls 
for lending to unhedged borrowers. We follow their approach in making some adjustments 
in the banking and private nonbanking sectors. We are able to obtain only approximate es-
timates because of the lack of data on the composition of assets and liabilities in both these 
sectors and on the extent to which private nonbanking sector borrowers of foreign currency 
are hedged. 
We assume that firms in the oil and gas industry are hedged against exchange rate 
risk due to the fact that most of their revenues are denominated in foreign currency. There-
fore, their foreign currency liabilities are not subject to exchange rate risk and should be Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
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subtracted from the liabilities of the private nonbanking sector. We calculate the fraction of 
foreign currency bank loans to the oil and gas industry in total loans to non-financial or-
ganizations and as in  Ranciere et al. (2010) extrapolate to the household sector. We do this 
under the simplifying assumption that the same fraction of bank loans to households corre-
sponds to loans made by households receiving income from oil and gas industry. Then we 
subtract these „hedged‟ bank loans from the liabilities of the private nonbanking sector and 
reduce banking sector assets by an amount equal to „unhedged‟ bank loans. As for the ex-
ternal liabilities of private nonbanking sector, we also try to subdivide them into „hedged‟ 
and „unhedged‟. Using the data on external foreign currency debt securities, we are able to 
estimate the volume of foreign currency bonds in circulation issued by oil and gas firms 
and subtract it from the external foreign currency liabilities of the whole sector. Since we 
do not have data on the sectoral structure of external foreign currency loans, we assume 
that the fraction of external foreign currency loans going to oil and gas firms is equal to 
that of syndicated foreign currency loans going to the oil and gas industry. By eliminating 
these loans from external foreign currency liabilities, we obtain the adjusted foreign cur-
rency position. 
Figures 14-16 show both adjusted and unadjusted net foreign currency positions 
of the banking sector, private nonbanking sector and the Russian economy as a whole over 
the period 2004 to 2010. Due to the fact that a significant share of foreign currency bank 
loans went to borrowers with no foreign currency income, the adjusted net foreign cur-
rency position of the banking sector shows that throughout the period studied the banking 
sector was vulnerable to ruble depreciation. As for the private nonbanking sector, its ad-
justed net foreign currency position has improved. This allows us to conclude that not only 
the private nonbanking sector but also the banking sector was subject to currency risk prior 
to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Comparison of the adjusted and unadjusted currency 
mismatch measures shows that, by controlling for unhedged foreign currency liabilities, we 
can obtain a more accurate assessment of the exposure of different sectors of the Russian 
economy to exchange rate risk. 
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4  Financial dollarization and macroeconomic  
  performance during the crisis 
 
The recent global financial crisis has led to a rapid and sharp deterioration of economic ac-
tivity throughout the world. One possible reason for emerging economies‟ vulnerability to 
the crisis was the high level of private sector liability dollarization. Liabilities dollarization 
can lead to balance-sheet effects that may hamper real sector performance in case of ex-
change rate depreciation. As a result, exchange rate depreciation may become contraction-
ary, which would call for exchange rate stabilization measures. In fact, concern about the 
vulnerability of the Russian economy to balance-sheet risks may be viewed as a factor that 
largely determined the need for the Bank of Russia to attempt to stabilize the foreign ex-
change market in late 2008 and early 2009.  
A number of recent empirical studies confirm the possibility of the contractionary 
effect of exchange rate depreciation in the presence of liabilities dollarization. Benhima 
(2011) investigates the impact of exchange rate flexibility on growth and finds it to be 
growth-reducing in highly dollarized countries. Similarly, Cespedes (2005) finds that the 
interaction between the real exchange rate and the level of external debt dollarization leads BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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to balance sheet effects that have a significant negative impact on output. In addition, find-
ings of Bebczuk et al. (2006) indicate that it is investment rather than consumption that is 
most severely affected  by  a real  exchange rate devaluation.  In a more general  setting, 
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011) confirm the hypothesis that financial crises are more harm-
ful in terms of output losses for countries whose banking systems are highly dependent on 
external financing. Using seven models from  the above-mentioned papers, we estimate the 
expected growth losses due to ruble depreciation in the presence of liability dollarization 
following the crisis of 2008 (i.e. we applied the actual depreciation that occurred during the 
crisis to the pre-crisis levels of dollarization). Our estimates of the annual economic growth 
reduction are in the range of 0.1% to 3.7%. The median result, however, is only 0.4%. Five 
of seven models yielded an estimated growth loss of less than 1%. Therefore, considering 
the dramatic transition of the Russian economy from 7% pa GDP growth in 2000-2008 to a 
negative 7.8% in 2009, only a small fraction of post-crisis recession in Russia can be asso-
ciated with financial dollarization. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Financial dollarization is the prominent feature of the Russian economy. Its level is highly 
unstable and displays sharp fluctuations in response to changes in the macroeconomic en-
vironment. We found that the ruble appreciation rate (against the USD and euro) was the 
main driving factor for the deposit de-dollarization that occurred and also for the later epi-
sode of deposit dollarization. This means that exchange rate fluctuations in Russia are usu-
ally amplified by changes in currency preferences. Loan dollarization was also found to 
depend positively on the ruble depreciation rate, although during the financial crisis the 
exchange rate effect was estimated to be smaller than the mechanical re-evaluation effect 
(reflecting the decrease in demand for foreign currency loans). There is also only slight 
evidence of currency matching behavior by the banks.  
Such behavior, together with substantial borrowing from abroad, has led to the 
large currency mismatches in the real sector‟s balance sheet. The banking sector may seem 
to be less vulnerable to exchange rate risk, but, after taking into account the fact that a 
large part of banks assets are claims on domestic unhedged borrowers, we conclude that 
not only the private nonbanking sector but also the banking sector was subject to currency Alexey Ponomarenko, Alexandra Solovyeva  
and Elena Vasilieva 
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risk prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. In conditions of financial turmoil (and ensu-
ing capital-flow reversals and downward pressure on the domestic currency), this situation 
could threaten the macroeconomic stability of the Russian economy. Presumably this was 
one of the reasons for the Bank of Russia undertaking costly measures and conducting the 
“controlled depreciation”, spending a significant amount of foreign exchange reserves in 
the process 
The presence of financial dollarization prior to the crisis probably contributed to 
the fall in GDP in 2009, but could hardly be considered among the most important factors 
behind the recession. 
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Appendix  Data and sources 
 
Adjusted net foreign currency position of banking sector: net foreign currency position of 
banking sector minus „unhedged‟ foreign currency bank loans to private nonbanking sector 
(equal to total foreign currency bank loans to private nonbanking sector times the share of 
foreign-currency bank loans to oil and gas firms in total foreign-currency bank loans to 
non-financial organizations). 
 
Adjusted net foreign-currency position of private nonbanking sector: net foreign-currency 
position of private nonbanking sector plus „hedged‟ foreign-currency bank loans plus out-
standing foreign-currency bonds issued by oil and gas firms and plus „hedged‟ external 
foreign-currency liabilities (equal  to  total  external  foreign-currency liabilities times the 
share of syndicated foreign-currency loans to oil and gas industry in total foreign-currency 
syndicated loans). 
 
Foreign cash in circulation outside of banking system: foreign-currency cash holdings of 
other sectors (annual). Source: International Investment Position of Russian Federation, 
External Sector Statistics, Bank of Russia. To obtain quarterly values we use the data on 
foreign-currency cash holdings of other sectors from the Balance of Payments of the Rus-
sian Federation. Source: External Sector Statistics, Bank of Russia. 
 
Foreign-currency bank loans to oil and gas industry. Source: Statistics on deposits and 
loans, Internal Bank of Russia database. 
 
Outstanding foreign-currency bonds issued by oil and gas firms. Source: Cbonds agency. 
 
Foreign debt dollarization: share of foreign-currency debt in total debt. Source: External 
Debt of the Russian Federation, External Sector Statistics, Bank of Russia. 
 
Net foreign assets of commercial banks. Source: Credit Institutions Survey, Monetary and 
Financial Statistics, Bank of Russia. 
 
Syndicated loans. Source: Cbonds agency.   Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 
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